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Abstract
Even when a system is proven to be correct with respect to a specification, there is still a question
of how complete the specification is, and whether it really covers all the behaviors of the system. Cov-
erage metrics attempt to check which parts of a system are actually relevant for the verification process
to succeed. Recent work on coverage in model checking suggests several coverage metrics and algo-
rithms for finding parts of the system that are not covered by the specification. The work has already
proven to be effective in practice, detecting design errors that escape early verification efforts in indus-
trial settings. In this paper, we relate a formal definition of causality given in [Halpern and Pearl 2001]
to coverage. We show that it gives significant insight into unresolved issues regarding the definition of
coverage and leads to potentially useful extensions of coverage. In particular, we introduce the notion
of responsibility, which assigns to components of a system a quantitative measure of their relevance to
the satisfaction of the specification.
1 Introduction
In model checking, we verify the correctness of a finite-state system with respect to a desired behavior by
checking whether a labeled state-transition graph that models the system satisfies a specification of this
behavior [Clarke, Grumberg, and Peled 1999]. An important feature of model-checking tools is their abil-
ity to provide, along with a negative answer to the correctness query, a counterexample to the satisfaction
of the specification in the system. These counterexamples can be essential in detecting subtle errors in
complex designs [Clarke, Grumberg, McMillan, and Zhao 1995]. On the other hand, when the answer to
the correctness query is positive, most model-checking tools terminate with no further information to the
user. Since a positive answer means that the system is correct with respect to the specification, this may
seem to be reasonable at first glance.
In the last few years, however, there has been growing awareness that further analysis may be nec-
essary even if a model checker reports that a specification is satisfied by a given system. The concern
is that the satisfiability may be due to an error in the specification of the desired behavior or the mod-
elling of the system, rather than being due to the correctness of the system. Two main lines of research
have focused on techniques for checking such errors. One approach involves vacuity detection, that is,
checking whether the specification is satisfied for vacuous reasons in the model [Beatty and Bryant 1994;
Beer, Ben-David, Eisner, and Rodeh 1997; Kurshan 1998; Kupferman and Vardi 1999; Purandare and Somenzi 2002].
One particularly trivial reason for vacuity is that the specification is valid; perhaps more interesting are
∗Address: College of Information and Computer Science, Boston, MA 02115, U.S.A. Email: hanac@ccs.neu.edu
†Address: Department of Computer Science, Ithaca, NY 14853, U.S.A. Email: halpern@cs.cornell.edu.
‡Address: School of Engineering and Computer Science, Jerusalem 91904, Israel. Email: orna@cs.huji.ac.il
cases of antecedent failure or valid/unsatisfiable constraints in the system. For example, the branching-
time specification AG(req → AFgrant) (every request is eventually followed by a grant on every path) is
satisfied vacuously in a system where requests are never sent. A specification that is satisfied vacuously is
likely to point to some problems in the modelling of the system or its desired behavior.
A second approach, which is more the focus of this paper, uses what is called coverage estimation.
Initially, coverage estimation was used in simulation-based verification techniques, where coverage met-
rics are used in order to reveal states that were not visited during the testing procedure (i.e, not “covered”
by this procedure); see [Dill 1998; Peled 2001] for surveys. In the context of model checking, this intu-
ition has to be modified, as the process of model checking may visit all the states of the system regard-
less of their relevance to the satisfaction of the specification. Intuitively, a component or a state is cov-
ered by a specification ψ if changing this component falsifies ψ (see [Hoskote, Kam, Ho, and Zhao 1999;
Chockler, Kupferman, and Vardi 2001]). For example, if a specification requires that AG(req → AFgrant)
holds at an initial state, and there is a path in which req holds only in one state, followed by two states
both satisfying grant, then neither of these two states is covered by the specification (changing the truth of
grant in either one does not render the specification untrue). On the other hand, if there is only one state
on the path in which grant holds, then that state is covered by the specification. The intuition is that the
presence of many uncovered states suggests that either the specification the user really desires has more
requirements than those explicitly written (for example, perhaps the specification should really require a
correspondence between the number of requests and grants), or that the system contains redundancies, and
can perhaps be simplified (for example, perhaps there should be only a single grant on the path). This ap-
proach has already proven to be effective in practice, detecting design errors that escape early verification
efforts in industrial settings [Hoskote, Kam, Ho, and Zhao 1999].
Roughly speaking, coverage considers the question of what causes the system to satisfy the specifica-
tion. The philosophy literature has long been struggling with the problem of defining what it means for one
event to cause another. In this paper, we relate a formal definition of causality given in [Halpern and Pearl 2001]
to coverage. We show that it gives significant insight into unresolved issues regarding the definition of cov-
erage, and leads to potentially useful extensions of coverage.
The definition of causality used in [Halpern and Pearl 2001], like other definitions of causality in the
philosophy literature going back to Hume [Hume 1939], is based on counterfactual dependence. Essen-
tially, event A is a cause of event B if, had A not happened (this is the counterfactual condition, since A
did in fact happen) then B would not have happened. Unfortunately, this definition does not capture all the
subtleties involved with causality. (If it did, there would be far fewer papers in the philosophy literature!)
For example, suppose that Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them at a bottle. Suzy’s rock gets
there first, shattering the bottle. Since both throws are perfectly accurate, Billy’s would have shattered the
bottle had it not been preempted by Suzy’s throw. (This story is taken from [Hall 2003].) Thus, according
to the counterfactual condition, Suzy’s throw is not a cause for shaterring the bottle. This problem is dealt
with in [Halpern and Pearl 2001] by, roughly speaking, taking A to be a cause of B if B counterfactually
depends on A under some contingency. For example, Suzy’s throw is a cause of the bottle shattering
because the bottle shattering counterfactually depends on Suzy’s throw, under the contingency that Billy
doesn’t throw. It may seem that this solves one problem only to create another. While this allows Suzy’s
throw to be a cause of the bottle shattering, it also seems to allow Billy’s throw to be a cause too.
Why do most people think that Suzy’s throw is a cause and Billy’s is not? Clearly, it is because Suzy’s
throw hit first. As is shown in [Halpern and Pearl 2001], in a naive model that does not take into account
who hit first, both Suzy’s throw and Billy’s throw are in fact causes. But in a more sophisticated model
that can talk about the fact that Suzy’s throw came first, Suzy’s throw is a cause, but Billy’s is not. One
moral of this example is that, according to the [Halpern and Pearl 2001] definitions, whether or not A is a
cause of B depends in part on the model used. Event A can be the cause of event B in one model and not
in another.
What is the connection of all this to coverage? First, note that the main definitions of coverage in
the literature are inspired by counterfactual dependence. Indeed, a state s is p-covered by the specifi-
cation ψ if, had the value of the atomic proposition p been different in state s, then ψ would not have
been true. The initial definition of coverage [Hoskote, Kam, Ho, and Zhao 1999] and its generalization in
[Chockler, Kupferman, and Vardi 2001] can be understood in terms of causality. The variant definition of
coverage used in the algorithm proposed in [Hoskote, Kam, Ho, and Zhao 1999], which the authors say is
“less formal but meets our intuitions better”, can also be described as an instance of causality. In fact, the
variant definition can be captured using ideas similar to those needed to deal with the Suzy-Billy story.
For example, the distinction in [Hoskote, Kam, Ho, and Zhao 1999] between the first position in which an
eventuality is satisfied and later positions in which the eventuality is satisfied is similar to the distinction
between Suzy, whose rock gets to the bottle first, and Billy, whose rock gets there later.
Thinking in terms of causality has other advantages. In particular, using an extension of causality
called responsibility, introduced in a companion paper [Chockler and Halpern 2003], we can do a more
fine-grained analysis of coverage. To understand this issue, let us return to Suzy and Billy, and consider
a scenario in which their rocks get to the bottle at exactly the same time. If we identify causality with
counterfactual dependence, then both Suzy and Billy can claim that her or his rock does not cause the
bottle to shatter. On the other hand, according to the definition in [Halpern and Pearl 2001], both Suzy
and Billy are causes of the bottle shattering (for example, the bottle shattering depends counterfactually
on Suzy’s throw if Billy does not throw). We would like to say that Suzy and Billy each have some
responsibility for the bottle being shattered, but Suzy, for example, is less responsible than she would be in
a scenario in which she is the only one that throws a rock. And if, instead of just Suzy and Billy, there are
100 children all throwing rocks at the bottle, hitting it simultaneously, we would like to say that each child
is less responsible for the bottle being shattered than in the case of Suzy and Billy and their two rocks.
Going back to coverage, note that a state either covers a specification, or it doesn’t. This all-or-nothing
property seems to miss out on an important intuition. Consider for example the specification EXp. There
seems to be a qualitative difference between a system where the initial state has 100 successors satisfying
p and one where there are only two successors satisfying p. Although, in both cases, no state is p-covered
by the specification, intuitively, the states that satisfy p play a more important role in the case where there
are only two of them than in the case where there are 100 of them. That is, each of the two successors is
more responsible for the satisfaction of EXp than each of the 100 successors.
According to the definition in [Chockler and Halpern 2003], the degree of responsibility of a state s
for a specification ψ is a number between 0 and 1. A state s is covered by specification ψ iff its degree
of responsibility for ψ is 1; the value of s is a cause of ψ being true if the degree of responsibility of s
for ψ is positive. A degree 0 of responsibility says intuitively that s plays no role in making ψ true; a
degree of responsibility strictly between 0 and 1 says that s plays some role in making ψ true, even if s by
itself failing will not make ψ false. For example, if the specification is EXp and the initial state has two
successors where p is true, then the degree of responsibility of each one for EXp is 1/2; if there are one
hundred successors where p is true, then the degree of responsibility of each one is 1/100.
The issue of responsibility becomes particularly significant when one considers that an important rea-
son that a state might be uncovered is due to fault tolerance. Here, one checks the ability of the system to
cope with unexpected hardware or software faults, such as power failure, a link failure, a Byzantine fault,
etc. [Lynch 1996]. It is often the case that fault tolerance is achieved by duplication, so that if one compo-
nent fails, another can take over. Accordingly, in this analysis, redundancies in the system are welcome: a
state that is covered represents a single point of failure; if there is some physical problem or software
problem that involves this state, then the specification will not be satisfied. To increase fault tolerance,
we want states to be uncovered. On the other hand, we still want states to somehow “carry their weight”.
Thus, from the point of view of fault tolerance, while having a degree of responsibility of 1 is not good,
since it means a single point of failure, a degree of responsibility of 1/100 implies perhaps unnecessary
redundancy.
2 Definitions and Notations
In this section, we review the definitions of causality and responsibility from [Halpern and Pearl 2001]
and [Chockler and Halpern 2003]. As we argue below, models in formal verification are binary, thus
we only present the significantly simpler versions of causality and responsibility for binary models (see
[Eiter and Lukasiewicz 2002b] for the simplification of the definition of causality for the binary case). We
also omit several other aspects of the general definition including the division of variables to exogenous
and endogenous. Readers interested in the general framework of causality are refered to Appendix A.
We also present the definitions of causality and responsibility for Boolean circuits and argue that binary
recursive causal models are equivalent to Boolean circuits. We use Boolean circuits in our algorithms for
computing responsibility in model checking and we justify this choice in Section 3.3.
2.1 Binary causal models
Definition 2.1 (Binary causal model) A binary causal model M is a tuple 〈V,F〉, where V is the set of
boolean variables and F associates with every variable X ∈ V a function FX that describes how the
value of X is determined by the values of all other variables in V . A context ~u is a legal setting for the
variables in V .
A causal model M is conveniently described by a causal network, which is a graph with nodes corre-
sponding to the variables in V and an edge from a node labeled X to one labeled Y if FY depends on the
value of X. We restrict our attention to what are called recursive models. These are ones whose associated
causal network is a directed acyclic graph.
A causal formula ϕ is a boolean formula over the set of variables V . A causal formula ϕ is true or
false in a causal model given a context. We write (M,~u) |= ϕ if ϕ is true in M given a context ~u. We
write (M,~u) |= [~Y ← ~y](X = x) if the variable X has value x in the model M given the context ~u and
the assignment ~y to the variables in the set ~Y ⊂ V .
With these definitions in hand, we can give the definition of cause from [Halpern and Pearl 2001;
Eiter and Lukasiewicz 2002b].
Definition 2.2 (Cause) We say that X = x is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) if the following conditions hold:
AC1. (M,~u) |= (X = x) ∧ ϕ.
AC2. There exist a subset ~W of V with X 6∈ ~W and some setting (x′, ~w′) of the variables in (X, ~W ) such
that the following two conditions hold:
(a) (M,~u) |= [X ← x′, ~W ← ~w′]¬ϕ. That is, changing (X, ~W ) from (x, ~w) to (x′, ~w′) changes
ϕ from true to false.
(b) (M,~u) |= [X ← x, ~W ← ~w′]ϕ. That is, setting ~W to ~w′ should have no effect on ϕ as long
as X has the value x.
The definition of responsibility refines the “all-or-nothing” concept of causality by measuring the de-
gree of responsibility of X = x in the truth value of ϕ in (M,~u). The definition of responsibility is due to
[Chockler and Halpern 2003], and we give here only the simpler definition for binary models.
Definition 2.3 (Responsibility) The degree of responsibility of X = x for the value of ϕ in (M,~u),
denoted dr((M,~u),X = x, ϕ), is 1/(| ~W |+1), where ~W ⊆ V is the smallest set of variables that satisfies
the condition AC2 in Definition 2.2.
Thus, the degree of responsibility measures the minimal number of changes that have to be made in ~u
in order to falsify ϕ. If X = x is not a cause of ϕ in (M,~u), then the minimal set ~W in Definition 2.3
is taken to have cardinality ∞, and thus the degree of responsibility of X = x is 0. If ϕ counterfactually
depends on X = x, then its degree of responsibility is 1. In other cases the degree of responsibility is
strictly between 0 and 1. Note that X = x is a cause of ϕ iff the degree of responsibility of X = x for the
value of ϕ is greater than 0.
2.2 Causality and responsibility in Boolean circuits
In this section, we consider an important setting in which to consider causality and responsibility: Boolean
circuits. A Boolean circuit is just a representation of a propositional formula, where the leaves represent
atomic propositions and the interior nodes represent the Boolean operations ¬, ∧, and ∨. Given an assign-
ment of values to the leaves, the value of the root is the value of the formula. Without loss of generality, we
assume that propositional formulas are in positive normal form, so that negation is applied only to atomic
propositions. (Converting a formula to an equivalent formula in positive normal form at most doubles the
length of the formula.) Thus, in the Boolean circuit, negations occur only at the level above the leaves. We
also assume without loss of generality that all ∧ and ∨ gates in a Boolean circuit are binary.
Let g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function on n variables, and let C be a Boolean circuit that
computes g. As usual, we say that a circuit C is monotone if it has no negation gates. We denote by ~X the
set of variables of C. A truth assignment f to the set ~X is a function f : ~X → {1, 0}. The value of a gate w
of C under an assignment f is defined as the value of the function of this gate under the same assignment.
Thus, we can extend the domain of f to all gates of the circuit. For an assignment f and a variable X, we
denote by f˜X the truth assignment that differs from f in the value of X. Formally, f˜X(Y ) = f(Y ) for all
Y 6= X, and f˜X(X) = ¬f(X). Similarly, for a set ~Z ⊆ ~X , f˜~Z is the truth assignment that differs from f
in the values of variables in ~Z.
It is easy to see that Boolean circuits are a special case of binary causal models, where each gate of
the circuit is a variable of the model, and values of inner gates are computed based on the values of the
inputs to the circuit and the Boolean functions of the gates. A context ~u is a setting to the input variables
of the circuit. For the ease of presentation, we explicitly define the notion of criticality in Boolean circuits,
which captures the notion of counter-factual causal dependence.
Definition 2.4 Consider a Boolean circuit C over the set ~X of variables, an assignment f , a variable
X ∈ ~X, and a gate w of C. We say that X is critical for w under f if f˜X(w) = ¬f(w).
If a variable X is critical for the output gate of a circuit C, changing the value X alone causes a change
in the value of C. If X is not critical, changing its value alone does not affect the value of C. However,
it might be the case that changing the value of X together with several other variables causes a change in
the value of C. Fortunately, the definitions of cause and responsibility can be easily re-written for Boolean
circuits, where the only causal formulas we consider are the formulas of the gates.
Definition 2.5 Consider a Boolean circuit C over the set ~X of variables, an assignment f , a variable
X ∈ ~X, and a gate w of C. A (possibly empty) set ~Z ⊆ ~X \ {X} makes X critical for w if f˜~Z(w) = f(w)
and X is critical for w under f˜~Z . (The value of) X is a cause of (the value of) w if there is some ~Z that
makes X critical for w.
Similarly, we can re-write the definition of responsibility for Boolean circuits in the following way.
Definition 2.6 (Degree of Responsibility) Consider a Boolean circuit C over the set ~X of variables, an
assignment f , a variable X ∈ ~X , and a gate w of C. The degree of responsibility of (the value of) X for
(the value of) w under f , denoted dr(C,X,w, f), is 1/(1+ |~Z |), where ~Z ⊆ ~X \{X} is a set of variables
of minimal size that makes X critical for w under f .
Thus, dr(C,X,w, f) measures the minimal number of changes that have to be made in f in order to
make X critical for w. If no subset ~Z ⊆ ~X \ {X} makes X critical for w under f , then the minimal set
~Z in Definition 2.6 is taken to have cardinality ∞, and thus the degree of responsibility of X is 0. If X
is critical for w under f , then its degree of responsibility is 1. In other cases the degree of responsibility
is strictly between 0 and 1. We denote by dr(C,X, f) the degree of responsibility of X for the value
of the output gate of C. For example, if f is the assignment that gives all variables the value 1, then
dr(X1 ∨X2,X1, f) = 1/2, while dr(
∨100
i=1Xi,X1, f) = 1/100. For another example, consider a circuit
C = (X ∧ Y ) ∨ (X ∧ Z) ∨ (Y ∧ Z) ∨ (X ∧ U). That is, either two out of three variables X, Y , and Z
should be assigned 1, or X and U should be assigned 1 in order for C to have the value 1. Consider an
assignment f1 that assigns all variables the value 1. Then, dr(C,X, f1) = 1/3, since changing the value
of two out of three variables Y , Z , and U does not affect the value of C, but changing the value of two out
of three variables Y , Z , and U together with X falsifies C. Now consider an assignment f2 that assigns Y ,
Z , and U the value 1, and X the value 0. Clearly, changing the value of X from 0 to 1 cannot falsify C,
thus dr(C,X, f2) = 0. Finally, consider an assignment f3 that assigns X and Y the value 1, and Z and U
the value 0. In this case, changing the value of X alone falsifies C, so dr(C,X, f3) = 1.
Remark 2.7 We note that while we define the degree of responsibility for a specific circuit, in fact its
value depends solely on the Boolean function that is computed by the circuit and is insensitive to the
circuit structure. Thus, degree of responsibility is a semantic notion, not a syntactic one.
3 Coverage, Causality, and Responsibility in Model Checking
In this section we show how thinking in terms of causality and responsibility is useful in the study of cov-
erage. In Section 3.1 we show that the most common definition of coverage in model checking conforms to
the definition of counter-factual causality and demonstrate how the coverage information can be enhanced
by the degrees of responsibility of uncovered states. In Section 3.2 we discuss other definitions of coverage
that arise in the literature and in practice and describe how they fit into the framework of causality.
3.1 Coverage in the framework of causality
The following definition of coverage is perhaps the most natural one. It arises from the study of mu-
tant coverage in simulation-based verification [Millo, Lipton, and Sayward 1978; Millo and Offutt 1991;
Ammann and Black 2001], and is adopted in [Hoskote, Kam, Ho, and Zhao 1999; Chockler, Kupferman, and Vardi 2001;
Chockler, Kupferman, Kurshan, and Vardi 2001; Chockler and Kupferman 2002; amd M. Purandare and Somenzi 2003].
For a Kripke structure K , an atomic proposition q, and a state w, we denote by K˜w,q the Kripke structure
obtained from K by flipping the value of q in w. Similarly, for a set of states Z , K˜~Z,q is the Kripke
structure obtained from K by flipping the value of q in all states in Z .
Definition 3.1 (Coverage) Consider a Kripke structure K , a specification ϕ that is satisfied in K , and an
atomic proposition q ∈ AP . A state w of K is q-covered by ϕ if K˜w,q does not satisfy ϕ.
It is easy to see that coverage corresponds to the simple counterfactual-dependence approach to causal-
ity. Indeed, a state w of K is q-covered by ϕ if ϕ holds in K and if q had other value in w, then ϕ would not
have been true in K . The following example illustrates the notion of coverage and shows that the counter-
factual approach to coverage misses some important insights in how the system satisfies the specification.
Let K be a Kripke structure presented in Figure 1 and let ϕ = AG(req → AFgrant). It is easy to see
that K satisfies ϕ. State w7 is grant-covered by ϕ. On the other hand, states w2, w3, w4, and w5 are not
grant-covered, as flipping the value of grant in one of them does not falsify ϕ in K . Note that while the
value of grant in states w2, w3, and w4 plays a role in the satisfaction of ϕ in K , the value of grant in w5
does not. One way to capture this distinction is by using causality rather than coverage.
w6 w7
grantreq
w1 w2 w3 w4
req grant grant grant
grant
w5
w0
Figure 1: States w2, w3, and w4 are not covered by AG(req → AFgrant), but have degree of responsi-
bility 1/3 for its satisfaction.
Definition 3.2 Consider a Kripke structure K , a specification ϕ that is satisfied in K , and an atomic
proposition q ∈ AP . A state w is a cause of ϕ in K with respect to q if there exists a (possibly empty)
subset of states ~Y of K such that flipping the value of q in ~Y does not falsify ϕ in K , and flipping the value
of q in both w and ~Y falsifies ϕ in K .
In Figure 1, we describe a Kripke structure K in which the states w2, w3, w4, and w7 are causes of
AG(req → AFgrant) in K with respect to grant, while w5 is not a cause. This reflects the fact that while
the value of grant is critical for the satisfaction of ϕ only in the state w7, in states w2, w3, and w4 the value
of grant also has some effect on the value of ϕ in K . It does not, however, give us a quantative measure
of this effect. Such a quantative measure is provided using the analogue of responsibility in the context of
model checking.
Definition 3.3 Consider a Kripke structure K , a specification ϕ that is satisfied in K , and an atomic
proposition q ∈ AP . The degree of q-responsibility of a state w for ϕ is 1/(|~Z |+ 1), where ~Z is a subset
of states of K of minimal size such that K˜~Z,q satisfies ϕ and w is q-covered by ϕ in K˜~Z,q.
In the Kripke structure described in Figure 1, states w2, w3, and w4 have degree of responsibility 1/3
for the satisfaction of AG(req → AFgrant), state w5 has degree of responsibility 0, and state w7 has
degree of responsibility 1, all with respect to the atomic proposition grant.
Assigning to each state its degree of responsibility gives much more information than the yes/no an-
swer of coverage. Coverage does not distinguish between states that are quite important for the satisfaction
of the specification, even though not essential for it, and those that have very little influence on the satisfac-
tion of the specification; responsibility can do this well. This is particularly relevant for specifications that
implicitly involve disjunctions, such as formulas of the form EXψ or EFψ. Such specifications typically
result in many uncovered states. Using responsibility gives a sense of how redundant some of these states
really are. Moreover, as we observed in the introduction, any degree of redundancy in the system automat-
ically leads to low coverage. On the other hand, for fault tolerance, we may actually want to require that
no state has degree of state higher than, say, 1/3, that is, every state should be backed up at least twice.
3.2 Other definitions of coverage
In the previous section we showed that the definition of coverage used most often in the literature can be
captured in the framework of causality. There is another definition for coverage given in [Hoskote, Kam, Ho, and Zhao 1999]
that, while based on mutations, is sensitive to syntax. Thus, according to this definition, w may q-cover
ϕ but not q-cover ϕ′, although ϕ and ϕ′ are semantically equivalent formulas. The justification for such
syntactic dependencies is that the way a user chooses to write a specification carries some information.
(Recall that the same issue arose in the case of Boolean circuits, although there we offered a different jus-
tification for it.) The variant definition given in [Hoskote, Kam, Ho, and Zhao 1999] has two significant
advantages: it leads to an easier computational problem, and it deals to some extent with the fact that very
few states are covered by eventuality formulas, which implicitly involve disjunction. Moreover, according
to [Hoskote, Kam, Ho, and Zhao 1999], the definition “meets our intuitions better”.
Roughly speaking, the definition in [Hoskote, Kam, Ho, and Zhao 1999] distinguishes between the
first state where an eventuality is fulfilled and other states on the path. That is, if an eventuality ϕ is first
fulfilled in a state w in the original system and is no longer fulfilled in w in the mutant system obtained by
flipping the value of q in some state v, then v is said to be q-covered’ by ϕ, even if ϕ is still satisfied in the
mutant system.
To define cover′ precisely, a specification ϕ is transformed to a new specification transq(ϕ) that may
include a fresh atomic proposition q′, such that a statew is q-covered′ by ϕ in Kripke structure K iffw is q′-
covered by transq(ϕ) in the Kripke structure K ′ that extends K by defining q′ to be true at exactly the same
states as q. We do not give the full definition of transq here (see [Hoskote, Kam, Ho, and Zhao 1999]);
however, to give the intuition, we show how it works for universal until formulas. Assuming that transq
has been recursively defined for ϕ and ψ, let
transq(A(ϕUψ)) = A[trans q(ϕ)Uψ] ∧A[(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)U trans q(ψ)],
where trans q(q) = q′, for some fresh atomic proposition q′, and trans q(p) = p if p 6= q. Thus, for
example, transq(A(pUq)) = A(pUq) ∧ (A(p ∧ ¬q)Uq′). It is not hard to see that if K satisfies A(pUq),
then w q-covers′ A(pUq) iff w is the first state where q is true in some path in K . For example, let K be a
structure that consists of a single path π = w0, w1, w2, . . ., and assume that w0 and w1 are the only states
where p is true and that w1 and w2 are the only states where q is true. Then the specification ϕ = A(pUq)
is satisfied in K and neither w1 nor w2 is q-covered by ϕ. Note that ϕ is fulfilled for the first time in w1
and that if we flip q in w1, w1 no longer fulfils the eventuality. Thus, w1 is q-covered′ by ϕ.
While the intuitiveness of this interpretation of coverage is debatable, it is interesting to see that this
requirement can be represented in the framework of causality. Intuitively, the eventuality being fulfilled
first in w1 is much like Suzy’s rock hitting the bottle first. And just as in that example, the key to capturing
the intuition is to add extra variables that describe where the eventuality is first fulfilled. Thus, we introduce
two additional variables called F1 (“eventuality is first fulfilled inw1”) and F2 (“eventuality is first fulfilled
in w2”). This gives us the causal model described in Figure 2.
w0
p
w1 w2
p
q
q
ApUq
F2
F1
w1
Figure 2: The cause of ApUq being true in K is taken to be the first place where the eventuality is fulfilled.
The definition of coverage for eventuality formulas in [Hoskote, Kam, Ho, and Zhao 1999] can be
viewed as checking whether an eventuality formula is satisfied “in the same way” in the original model and
the mutant model. Only a fragment of the universal subset of CTL is dealt with in [Hoskote, Kam, Ho, and Zhao 1999],
but this approach can be generalized to deal with other formulas that can be satisfied in several ways. For
example, a specification ψ = EXp is satisfied in a Kripke structure K if there exists at least one successor
of the initial state w0 labeled with p. If we want to check whether ψ is satisfied in a mutant structure K ′ in
the same way it is satisfied in the original system K , we introduce a new variable Xw for each successor
w of w0 and we assign 1 to Xw iff w is labeled with p. Then we replace model checking of ψ in mutant
systems by model checking of ψ′ =
∧
w∈succ(w0) lw, where lw is Xw if Xw = 1 and is ¬Xw otherwise.
Clearly, a mutant system satisfies ψ′ iff the mutation does not affect the values of p in successors of the
initial state. More generally, this idea of adding extra variables to check that certain features are preserved
can be used to give a more fine-grained control over what coverage is checking for.
3.3 Boolean circuits in model checking
To motivate Boolean circuits in the context of model checking, we review the automata-theoretic approach
to branching-time model checking, introduced in [Kupferman, Vardi, and Wolper 2000]. We focus on the
branching-time logic CTL. Formulas of CTL are built from a set AP of atomic propositions using the
Boolean operators ∨ and ¬, the temporal operators X (“next”) and U (“until”), and the path quantifiers
E (“exists a path”) and A (“for all paths”). Every temporal operator must be immediately preceded by
a path quantifier. The semantics of temporal logic formulas is defined with respect to Kripke structures,
which are labeled state-transition graphs; see [Emerson 1990] for details. Suppose that we want to check
whether a specification ϕ written in branching-time temporal logic holds for a system described by a
Kripke structure K . We assume that K has a special initial state denoted win. Checking if K satisfies ϕ
amounts to checking if the model with root win obtained by “unwinding” K satisfies ϕ.
In the automata-theoretic approach, we transform ϕ to an alternating tree automaton Aϕ that accepts
exactly the models of ϕ. Checking if K satisfies ϕ is then reduced to checking the nonemptiness of the
product AK,ϕ of K and Aϕ (where we identify K with the automaton that accepts just K). When ϕ
is a CTL formula, the automaton Aϕ is linear in the length of ϕ; thus, the product automaton is of size
O(|K| · |ϕ|).
Let W be the set of states in K and let AP be the set of atomic propositions appearing in ψ. The
product automaton AK,ϕ can be viewed as a graph GK,ϕ. The interior nodes of GK,ϕ are pairs 〈w,ψ〉,
where w ∈ W and ψ is a subformula of ϕ that is not an atomic proposition. The root of GK,ϕ is the
vertex 〈win, ϕ〉. The leaves of GK,ϕ are pairs 〈w, p〉 or 〈w,¬p〉, where w ∈W and p ∈ AP . As shown in
[Chockler, Kupferman, and Vardi 2001], we can assume that each interior node 〈w,ψ〉 has two successors,
and is classified according to the type of ψ as an OR-node or an AND-node. Each leaf 〈w, p〉 or 〈w,¬p〉
has a value, 1 or 0, depending on whether p is in the label of state w in the model K . The graph has at
most 2 · |AP | · |W | leaves.
We would like to view the graph GK,ϕ as a Boolean circuit. To do this, we first replace each node
labeled 〈w,¬p〉 by a NOT-node, and add an edge from the leaf 〈w, p〉 to the NOT-node. Clearly this does
not increase the size of the graph. The only thing that now prevents GK,ϕ from being a Boolean circuit
is that it may have cycles. However, as shown in [Kupferman, Vardi, and Wolper 2000], each cycle can
be “collapsed” into one node with many successors; this node can then be replaced by a tree, where each
node has two successors. The size of the resulting graph is still O(|K| · |ϕ|). Model checking is equivalent
to finding the value of the root of GK,ϕ given the values of the leaves. That is, model checking reduces to
evaluating a Boolean circuit. The following result is straightforward, given the definitions.
Proposition 3.4 Consider a Kripke structure K , a specification ϕ, and an atomic proposition q. The
following are equivalent:
(a) the degree of q-responsibility of w for ϕ is 1/k;
(b) the node (w, q) has degree of responsibility 1/k for (win, ϕ) in the Boolean circuit corresponding
to K and ϕ;
(c) Xw,q has degree of responsibility 1/k for the output in the causal model corresponding to K and ϕ.
It is almost immediate from Proposition 3.4 that w is q-covered by ϕ in the Kripke structure K iff (w, q)
is critical (i.e., has degree of responsibility 1) for the value of (win, ϕ) in the Boolean circuit iff Xw,q has
degree of responsibility 1 for the value of the output in the causal model.
4 Computing the Degree of Responsibility in Binary Causal Models
In this section we examine the complexity of computing the degree of responsibility. We start with the
complexity result for the general case of binary causal models. Then we discuss several special cases for
which the complexity of computing responsibility is much lower and is feasible for practical applications.
4.1 The general case
For a complexity class A, FPA[logn] consists of all functions that can be computed by a polynomial-
time Turing machine with an oracle for a problem in A, which on input x asks a total of O(log |x|)
queries (cf. [Papadimitriou 1984]). Eiter and Lukasiewicz [Eiter and Lukasiewicz 2002a] show that test-
ing causality is ΣP2 -complete; in [Chockler and Halpern 2003], it is shown that the problem of computing
responsibility is FPΣP2 [logn]-complete for general causal models. Eiter and Lukasiewicz showed that in
binary causal models, computing causality is NP-complete. Since the causal model corresponding to a
Boolean circuit is binary, computing causality is NP-complete in Boolean circuits. We show that com-
puting the degree of responsibility is FPNP[logn]-complete in binary causal models. We actually prove the
FPNP[logn]-completeness first for Boolean circuits. Then we show that a slight extension of our argument
can be used to prove the same complexity result for all binary causal models.
Formally, the problem RESP-CIRCUIT is defined as follows: given a circuit C over the set of variables
~X, a variable X ∈ ~X, and a truth assignment f , compute dr(C,X, f). We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 RESP-CIRCUIT is FPNP[logn]-complete.
The proofs of Theorem 4.1 and its easy extension below can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.2 Computing the degree of responsibility is FPNP[logn]-complete in binary causal models.
By Proposition 3.4, the upper bound in Theorem 4.1 applies immediately to computing the degree of
responsibilty of a state w for a formula ϕ. The lower bound also applies to model checking, since it is
not hard to show that for every Boolean function f over the set of variables ~X and assignment ~x there
exists a pair 〈K,ϕ〉 such that K is a Kripke structure, ϕ is a specification, and model checking of ϕ in K
amounts to evaluating a circuit C that computes f under the assignment ~x. Indeed, let K be a single-state
structure with a self-loop over the set ~X of atomic propositions, where the single state of K is labeled with
X ∈ ~X iff X is 1 under the assignment ~x. Let ϕ be a propositional formula over the set of variables ~X
that computes the function f . Then the graph GK,ϕ is a circuit that computes f and evaluating GK,ϕ is
equivalent to evaluating f under the assignment ~x.
4.2 Tractable special cases
Theorem 4.1 shows that there is little hope of finding a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the
degree of responsibility for general circuits. The situation may not be so hopeless in practice. For one
thing, we are typically not interested in the exact degree of responsibility of a node, but rather want a
report of all the nodes that have low degree of responsibility. This is the analogue of getting a report of the
nodes that are not covered, which is the goal of algorithms for coverage. As in the case of coverage, the
existence of nodes that have a low degree of responsibility suggests either a problem with the specification
or unnecessary redundancies in the system.
Clearly, for any fixed k, the problem of deciding whether dr(C,X,w, f) ≥ 1/k can be solved in
time O(| ~X |k) by the naive algorithm that simply checks whether X is critical for C under the assign-
ment f˜~Z for all possible sets ~Z ⊆ ~X of size at most k − 1. The test itself can clearly be done in
linear time. We believe that, as in the case of coverage, where the naive algorithm can be improved
by an algorithm that exploits the fact that we check many small variants of the same Kripke structure
[Chockler, Kupferman, and Vardi 2001], there are algorithms that are even more efficient. In any case,
this shows that for values of k like 2 or 3, which are perhaps of most interest in practice, computing
responsibility is quite feasible.
There is also a natural restriction on circuits that allows a linear-time algorithm for responsibility. We
say that a Boolean formula ϕ is read-once if each variable appears in ϕ only once. Clearly, a Boolean
circuit for a read-once formula is a tree. While only a small fraction of specifications are read-once,
every formula can be converted to a read-once formula simply by replacing every occurrence of an atomic
proposition by a new atomic proposition. For example, ψ = (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r) can be converted to
ψ′ = (p0∧q)∨(p1∧r). Given an assignment for the original formula, there is a corresponding assignment
for the converted formula that gives each instance of an atomic proposition the same truth value. While this
does not change the truth value of the formula, it does change responsibility and causality. For example,
under the assignment that gives every atomic proposition the value 1, p is critical for ψ and thus has
responsibility 1 for the value of ψ, while under the corresponding assignment, p0 has responsibility only
1/2 for ψ′. Similarly, p is not a cause of the value of p ∨ ¬p under the assignment that gives value 1 to p,
but p0 is cause of the value of p0 ∨ ¬p1 under the corresponding assignment.
If we think of each occurrence of an atomic proposition as being “handled” by a different process,
then as far as fault tolerance goes, the converted formula is actually a more reasonable model of the
situation. The conversion models the fact that each occurrence of p in ψ can then fail “independently”. This
observation shows exactly why different models may be appropriate to capture causality. Interestingly,
this type of conversion is also used in vacuity detection in [Beer, Ben-David, Eisner, and Rodeh 1997;
Kupferman and Vardi 1999; Purandare and Somenzi 2002], where each atomic proposition is assumed to
have a single occurrence in the formula.
In model checking, we can convert a Boolean circuit obtained from the product of a system K with
a specification ϕ to a read-once tree by unwinding the circuit into a tree. This results in a degree of
responsibility assigned to each occurrence of a pair 〈w,ψ〉, and indeed each pair may occur several times.
The way one should interpret the result is then different than the interpretation for the Boolean-circuit
case and has the flavor of node coverage introduced in [Chockler, Kupferman, Kurshan, and Vardi 2001].
Essentially, in node coverage, one measures the effect of flipping the value of an atomic proposition in a
single occurrence of a state in the infinite tree obtained by unwinding the system.
The general problem of vacuity detection for branching-time specifications is co-NP-complete; the
problem is polynomial for read-once formulas [Kupferman and Vardi 1999]. Considering read-once for-
mulas also greatly simplifies computing the degree of responsibility. To prove this, we first need the
following property of monotone Boolean circuits.
Lemma 4.3 Given a monotone Boolean circuit C over the set ~X of variables, a variable X ∈ ~X, a gate
w ∈ C, and an assignment f , if f(w) 6= f(X), then dr(C,X,w, f) = 0.
Proof: Both functions ∧ and ∨ are monotone non-decreasing in both their variables, and thus also their
composition is monotone non-decreasing in each one of the variables. Each gate of C is a composition of
functions ∧,∨ over the set ~X of variables, thus all gates of C are monotone non-decreasing in each one
of the variables of C. A gate w represents a function over the basis {∧,∨}. The assignment f assigns the
variable X a value in {0, 1}, and f(w) is computed from the values assigned by f to all variables of C. We
assume that f(X) 6= f(w). Without loss of generality, let f(X) = 1 and f(w) = 0. Assume by way of
contradiction that dr(C,X,w, f) 6= 0. Then there exists a set ~Z ⊆ ~X \ {X} such that f˜~Z(w) = f(w) = 0
and X is critical for w under f˜~Z . Thus, changing the value of X from 1 to 0 changes the value of w from
0 to 1. However, this contradicts the fact that w is monotone nondecreasing in X.
The case where f(X) = 0 and f(w) = 1 follows by a dual argument.
Theorem 4.4 The problem of computing the degree of responsibility in read-once Boolean formulas can
be solved in linear time.
Proof: We describe a linear-time algorithm for computing the degree of responsibility for read-once
Boolean formulas. Since we have assumed that formulas are given in positive normal form, we can as-
sume that the trees that represent the formulas do not contain negation gates. (The leaves may be labeled
with negations of atomic propositions instead.) This means that the circuits corresponding to read-once
formulas can be viewed as monotone Boolean treess, to which Lemma 4.3 can be applied.
Consider the following algorithm, which gets as in put a monotone Boolean tree T , an assignment f ,
and a variable X whose degree of responsibility for the value of T under the assignment f we want to
compute. The algorithm starts from the variables and goes up the tree to the root. For each node w in the
tree, the algorithm computes two values, size(T,X,w, f), which is the size of the minimal ~Z such that X
is critical for w under f˜~Z , and the c(w, f), the size of the minimal ~Z such that ~Z ⊆ ~X and f˜~Z(w) 6= f(w).
Note that size(T,X,w, f) = 1
dr(T,X,w,f) − 1.
For a leaf lX labeled with X, we have c(lX , f) = 1 and size(T,X, lX , f) = 0, by Definition 2.6. For
a leaf lY labeled with Y 6= X we have c(lY , f) = 1 and size(T,X, lY , f) = 0. Let w be a gate that is
fed by gates u and v, and assume we have already computed size(T,X, y, f) and c(y, f), for y ∈ {u, v}.
Then size(T,X,w, f) and c(w, f) are computed as follows.
1. If size(T,X, u, f) = size(T,X, v, f) =∞, then size(T,X,w, f) =∞.
2. If w is an ∧-gate and f(w) = f(u) = f(v) = 0, or if w is ∨-gate and f(w) = f(u) = f(v) = 1,
then c(w) = c(u) + c(v) (because we have to change the values of both u and v in order to change
the value of w), and the size of minimal ~Z is computed as follows.
(a) If size(T,X, u, f) = i and size(T,X, v, f) =∞, then size(T,X,w, f) = i+ c(v).
(b) The case where size(T,X, u, f) < ∞ and size(T,X, v, f) < ∞ is impossible, since this
would mean that X is a successor of both u and v, contradicting the tree structure of T .
3. If w is an ∧-gate, f(w) = f(u) = 0 and f(v) = 1, or if w is an ∨-gate, f(w) = f(u) = 1, and
f(v) = 0, then c(w) = c(u), and the size of minimal ~Z is computed as follows.
(a) If size(T,X, u, f) = i and size(T,X, v, f) =∞, then size(T,X,w, f) = i.
(b) If size(T,X, v, f) = i and size(T,X, u, f) =∞, then size(T,X,w, f) =∞ by Lemma 4.3.
(c) The case where size(T,X, u, f) = i and size(T,X, v, f) = j is impossible by Lemma 4.3.
4. If w is an ∧-gate and f(w) = f(u) = f(v) = 1, or if w is an ∨-gate and f(w) = f(u) = f(v) = 0,
then c(w) = min(c(u), c(v)), and the size of minimal ~Z is computed as follows.
(a) If size(T,X, u, f) = i and size(T,X, v, f) =∞, then size(T,X,w, f) = i.
(b) The case where size(T,X, u, f) < ∞ and size(T,X, v, f) < ∞ is impossible, since X
cannot be a successor of both u and v in the tree T .
Clearly we can compute the size(T,X,w, f) and c(w, f) in constant time (given the information
that we already have at the time when we perform the computation). Moreover, because T is a tree, it
is easy to check that size(T,X,w, f) really is the size of the minimal ~Z such that X is critical for w
under f˜~Z . As we observed earlier, the degree of responsibility of X for the value of node w under f is
1/(1 + size(T,X,w, f)). Therefore, we proved the following proposition.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that it is useful to think of coverage estimation in terms of causality. This way of thinking
about coverage estimation not only shows that a number of different definitions of coverage can be thought
of as being defined by different models of causality, but also suggests how the notion of coverage might
be extended, to take into account which features of satisfaction are important. The notion of responsibility
also provides a useful generalization of coverage, that gives a more fine-grained analysis of the importance
of a state for satisfying a specification. Our complexity results suggest that these notions can be usefully
incorporated into current model-checking techniques.
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A The General Framework of Causality
In this section, we review the details of the definitions of causality and responsibility from [Halpern and Pearl 2001]
and [Chockler and Halpern 2003].
A signature is a tuple S = 〈U ,V,R〉, where U is a finite set of exogenous variables, V is a set of
endogenous variables, and the function R : U ∪ V → D associates with every variable Y ∈ U ∪ V a
nonempty set R(Y ) of possible values for Y from the range D. Intuitively, the exogenous variables are
ones whose values are determined by factors outside the model, while the endogenous variables are ones
whose values are ultimately determined by the exogenous variables. A causal model over signature S is
a tuple M = 〈S,F〉, where F associates with every endogenous variable X ∈ V a function FX such
that FX : (×U∈UR(U)) × (×Y ∈V\{X}R(Y )) → R(X). That is, FX describes how the value of the
endogenous variable X is determined by the values of all other variables in U ∪V . If the range D contains
only two values, we say that M is a binary causal model.
We can describe (some salient features of) a causal model M using a causal network. This is a graph
with nodes corresponding to the random variables in V and an edge from a node labeled X to one labeled
Y if FY depends on the value of X. Intuitively, variables can have a causal effect only on their descendants
in the causal network; if Y is not a descendant of X, then a change in the value of X has no affect on
the value of Y . For ease of exposition, we restrict attention to what are called recursive models. These
are ones whose associated causal network is a directed acyclic graph (that is, a graph that has no cycle of
edges). It should be clear that if M is a recursive causal model, then there is always a unique solution to
the equations in M , given a context, that is, a setting ~u for the variables in U .
The equations determined by {FX : X ∈ V} can be thought of as representing processes (or mech-
anisms) by which values are assigned to variables. For example, if FX(Y,Z,U) = Y + U (which we
usually write as X = Y + U ), then if Y = 3 and U = 2, then X = 5, regardless of how Z is set. This
equation also gives counterfactual information. It says that, in the context U = 4, if Y were 4, then X
would be u+ 4, regardless of what value X, Y , and Z actually take in the real world.
While the equations for a given problem are typically obvious, the choice of variables may not be. For
example, consider the rock-throwing example from the introduction. In this case, a naive model might
have an exogenous variable U that encapsulates whatever background factors cause Suzy and Billy to
decide to throw the rock (the details of U do not matter, since we are interested only in the context where
U ’s value is such that both Suzy and Billy throw), a variable ST for Suzy throws (ST = 1 if Suzy throws,
and ST = 0 if she doesn’t), a variable BT for Billy throws, and a variable BS for bottle shatters. In the
naive model, BS is 1 if one of ST and BT is 1.
ST
BT
BS
SH
BH
Figure 3: The rock-throwing example.
This causal model does not distinguish between Suzy and Billy’s rocks hitting the bottle simultane-
ously and Suzy’s rock hitting first. A more sophisticated model is the one that takes into account the fact
that Suzy throws first. It might also include variables SH and BH, for Suzy’s rock hits the bottle and Billy’s
rock hits the bottle. Clearly BS is 1 iff one of BH and BT is 1. However, now, SH is 1 if ST is 1, and
BH = 1 if BT = 1 and SH = 0. Thus, Billy’s throw hits if Billy throws and Suzy’s rock doesn’t hit. This
model is described by the following graph, where there is an arrow from variable X to variable Y if the
value of Y depends on the value of X. (The graph ignores the exogenous variable U , since it plays no
role.)
Given a causal model M = (S,F), a (possibly empty) vector ~X of variables in V , and vectors ~x
and ~u of values for the variables in ~X and U , respectively, we can define a new causal model denoted
M ~X←~x over the signature S ~X = (U ,V − ~X,R|V− ~X). Formally, M ~X←~x = (S ~X ,F
~X←~x), where F ~X←~xY
is obtained from FY by setting the values of the variables in ~X to ~x. Intuitively, this is the causal model
that results when the variables in ~X are set to ~x by some external action that affects only the variables in
~X; we do not model the action or its causes explicitly. For example, if M is the more sophisticated model
for the rock-throwing example, then MST←0 is the model where Suzy doesn’t throw.
Given a signature S = (U ,V,R), a formula of the form X = x, for X ∈ V and x ∈ R(X), is called
a primitive event. A basic causal formula is one of the form [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ, where ϕ is a
Boolean combination of primitive events; Y1, . . . , Yk are distinct variables in V; and yi ∈ R(Yi). Such
a formula is abbreviated as [~Y ← ~y]ϕ. The special case where k = 0 is abbreviated as ϕ. Intuitively,
[Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ says that ϕ holds in the counterfactual world that would arise if Yi is set to yi,
i = 1, . . . , k. A causal formula is a Boolean combination of basic causal formulas.
A causal formula ϕ is true or false in a causal model, given a context. We write (M,~u) |= ϕ if ϕ is
true in causal model M given context ~u. (M,~u) |= [~Y ← ~y](X = x) if the variable X has value x in
the unique (since we are dealing with recursive models) solution to the equations in M~Y←~y in context ~u
(that is, the unique vector of values for the exogenous variables that simultaneously satisfies all equations
F
~Y←~y
Z , Z ∈ V −
~Y , with the variables in U set to ~u). We extend the definition to arbitrary causal formulas
in the obvious way.
With these definitions in hand, we can give the definition of cause from [Halpern and Pearl 2001].
Definition A.1 We say that ~X = ~x is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) if the following three conditions hold:
AC1. (M,~u) |= ( ~X = ~x) ∧ ϕ.
AC2. There exist a partition (~Z, ~W ) of V with ~X ⊆ ~Z and some setting (~x′, ~w′) of the variables in
( ~X, ~W ) such that if (M,~u) |= Z = z∗ for Z ∈ ~Z, then
(a) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w′]¬ϕ. That is, changing ( ~X, ~W ) from (~x, ~w) to (~x′, ~w′) changes
ϕ from true to false.
(b) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w′, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]ϕ for all subsets ~Z ′ of ~Z . That is, setting ~W to
~w′ should have no effect on ϕ as long as ~X has the value ~x, even if all the variables in an
arbitrary subset of ~Z are set to their original values in the context ~u.
AC3. ( ~X = ~x) is minimal, that is, no subset of ~X satisfies AC2.
AC1 just says that A cannot be a cause of B unless both A and B are true, while AC3 is a minimality
condition to prevent, for example, Suzy throwing the rock and sneezing from being a cause of the bottle
shattering. Eiter and Lukasiewicz [Eiter and Lukasiewicz 2002b] showed that one consequence of AC3 is
that causes can always be taken to be single conjuncts. The core of this definition lies in AC2. Informally,
the variables in ~Z should be thought of as describing the “active causal process” from ~X to ϕ. These
are the variables that mediate between ~X and ϕ. AC2(a) is reminiscent of the traditional counterfactual
criterion. However, AC2(a) is more permissive than the traditional criterion; it allows the dependence of
ϕ on ~X to be tested under special structural contingencies, in which the variables ~W are held constant
at some setting ~w′. AC2(b) is an attempt to counteract the “permissiveness” of AC2(a) with regard to
structural contingencies. Essentially, it ensures that ~X alone suffices to bring about the change from ϕ to
¬ϕ; setting ~W to ~w′ merely eliminates spurious side effects that tend to mask the action of ~X .
To understand the role of AC2(b), consider the rock-throwing example again. Looking at the simple
model, it is easy to see that both Suzy and Billy are causes of the bottle shattering. Taking ~Z = {ST, BS},
consider the structural contingency where Billy doesn’t throw (BT = 0). Clearly [ST ← 0,BT ← 0]BS =
0 and [ST ← 1,BT ← 0]BS = 1 both hold, so Suzy is a cause of the bottle shattering. A symmetric
argument shows that Billy is also the cause.
But now consider the model described in Figure 3. It is still the case that Suzy is a cause in this model.
We can take ~Z = {ST, SH, BS} and again consider the contingency where Billy doesn’t throw. However,
Billy is not a cause of the bottle shattering. For suppose that we now take ~Z = {BT,BH, BS} and consider
the contingency where Suzy doesn’t throw. Clearly AC2(a) holds, since if Billy doesn’t throw (under this
contingency), then the bottle doesn’t shatter. However, AC2(b) does not hold. Since BH ∈ ~Z, if we set BH
to 0 (it’s original value), then AC2(b) requires that [BT ← 1, ST ← 0,BH ← 0](BS = 1) hold, but it does
not. Similar arguments show that no other choice of (~Z, ~W ) makes Billy’s throw a cause.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
First we prove membership in FPNP[logn] by describing an algorithm in FPNP[logn] for solving RESP-
CIRCUIT. The algorithm queries an oracle OLc for membership in the language Lc, defined as follows:
Lc = {〈C
′,X ′, f ′, i〉 : dr(C′,X ′, f ′) ≥ 1/i}.
In other words, 〈C′,X ′, f ′, i〉 ∈ Lc if there exists a set ~Z of variables of size at most i − 1 such that X ′
is critical for C′ under the assignment f˜ ′~Z . It is easy to see that Lc ∈ NP. Indeed, given a set
~Z of size at
most i− 1, the check for whether X ′ is critical for C′ under f˜ ′~Z can be performed in time linear in the size
of C′. Given input (C,X, f), the algorithm for solving RESP-CIRCUIT performs a binary search on the
value of dr(C,X, f), each time dividing the range of possible values for dr(C,X, f) by 2 according to the
answer of OLc . The number of possible candidates for dr(C,X, f) is the number of variables that appear
in C, and thus the number of queries to OLc is at most ⌈log n⌉, where n is the size of the input.
We now prove FPNP[logn]-hardness by a reduction from the problem CLIQUE-SIZE, which is known
to be FPNP[logn]-complete [Papadimitriou 1984; Krentel 1988; Papadimitriou 1994]. CLIQUE-SIZE is
the problem of determining the size of the largest clique of an input graph G. The reduction works as
follows. Let G = 〈~V , ~E〉 be a graph. We start by constructing a circuit CG, where the variables are the
nodes in ~V , and the output of the circuit is 1 iff the set of nodes assigned 0 forms a clique in G. The circuit
CG is CG =
∧
(V,W )6∈E(V ∨W ). It is easy to see that the value of CG under an assignment f is 1 iff there
are edges between all pairs of nodes that are assigned 0 by f . In other words, the set of nodes assigned 0
by f forms a clique in G.
Now let X be a variable that does not appear in CG. Consider the circuit C = X ∧ CG, and an
assignment F that assigns 0 to all variables in V and to X. It is easy to see that the value of C under F is 0,
and that for an assignment f that assigns X the value 1, C outputs the value of CG under the assignment f
restricted to V . We claim that dr(C,X, F ) = 1/i > 0 iff the size of the maximal clique in G is |V |− i+1,
and dr(C,X, F ) = 0 iff there is no clique in G.
We start with the “if” direction. Let dr(C,X, F ) = 1/i > 0. Then there exists a set ~Z ⊆ ~V of
size i − 1 such that F˜~Z(C) = ¬F˜~Z∪{X}(C). Since F˜~Z(X) = 0, we also have F˜~Z(C) = 0, and thus
F˜~Z∪{X}(C) = 1. Therefore, the value of CG under the assignment F˜~Z restricted to ~V is 1. Thus, the set of
variables assigned 0 in F˜~Z forms a clique in G. The assignment F˜~Z differs from F precisely on the values
it assigns to variables in ~Z; thus, the set of variables assigned 0 by F˜~Z is ~V \ ~Z . We know that |~Z| = i−1,
therefore |~V \ ~Z| = |~V | − i+1. On the other hand, by the definition of the degree of responsibility, for all
sets ~Z ⊆ V of size j < i− 1 we have F˜~Z(C) = ¬F˜~Z∪{X}(C). Thus, the value of CG under the assignment
F˜~Z restricted to ~V is 0. Thus, for all sets ~Z ⊆ ~V of size j < i − 1, we have that ~V \ ~Z is not a clique in
G. Therefore, the maximal clique in G is of size |~V | − i+ 1.
For the “only if” direction, let ~Y ⊆ ~V of size |~V | − i+ 1 be the maximal clique in G. Then the value
of CG is 1 under the assignment F˜~V \~Y . Therefore, F˜(~V \~Y )∪{X}(C) = 1, while F˜~V \~Y (C) = F (C) = 0.
Thus, X is critical for C under the assignment F˜~V \~Y , and therefore dr(C,X, f) ≥ i. On the other hand,
since ~Y is maximal, for all sets ~Z of size |~V | − j for j < i − 1, we have that ~Z is not a clique in G, thus
the value of CG is 0 under the assignment F˜~V \~Z . Therefore, F˜(~V \~Z)∪{X}(C) = 0 = F˜~V \~Z(C), and thus X
is not critical for C under the assignment F˜~V \~Z . It follows that dr(C,X, F ) ≤ i. Since dr(C,X, f) ≥ i,
we get that dr(C,X, F ) = i.
If dr(C,X, F ) = 0, then for all sets ~Z ⊆ ~V , we have F˜~Z∪{X}(C) = F˜~Z(C) = 0, and thus F˜~Z(CG) = 0.
Thus, there is no clique in G. For the converse, assume that there is no clique in G. For the other
direction, assume that there is no clique in G. Then for all ~Y ⊆ V , we have F˜~V \~Y (CG) = 0, thus
F˜(~V \~Y )∪{X}(C) = F˜~V \~Y (C) = 0. It follows that dr(C,X, F ) = 0.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
The lower bound follows from the lower bound in Theorem 4.1. For the upper bound, we use the following
observation made by Eiter and Lukasiewicz: for binary causal models, the condition AC2 can be replaced
by the following condition (to get an equivalent definition of causality):
AC2′. There exist a partition (~Z, ~W ) of V with ~X ⊆ ~Z and some setting (~x′, ~w′) of the variables in
( ~X, ~W ) such that if (M,~u) |= Z = z∗ for Z ∈ ~Z, then
1. (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w′]¬ϕ.
2. (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w′, ~Z ← ~z∗]ϕ.
That is, for binary causal models it is enough to check that changing the value of ~W does not falsify ϕ
if all other variables keep their original values. Thus, given a partition (~Z, ~W ) and a setting (~x′, ~w′) we
can verify that (X = x) is an active cause in polynomial time: both conditions in AC2′ are verifiable by
evaluating a Boolean formula under a given assignment to its variables. Thus checking causality in binary
models is in NP. Therefore, the following language L′c is also in NP.
L′c = {〈(M,~u), ψ, (X = x), i〉 : the degree of responsibility of (X = x)
for ψ in the context (M,~u) is at least 1/i}.
Indeed, membership of 〈(M,~u), ψ, (X = x), i〉 in L′c is verifiable in polynomial time similarly to the
causality check with the addition of measuring the size of witness ~W , which has to be at most i− 1. The
algorithm for computing the degree of responsibility of (X = x) for the value of ψ in the context (M,~u)
performs a binary search similarly to the same algorithm for Boolean circuits, each time dividing the range
of possible values by 2 according to the answer of an oracle to the NP language L′c. The number of queries
is bounded by ⌈log n⌉, where n is the size of the input, thus the problem is in FPNP[logn].
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